Hysteresis of plant closures and reopenings in the UK Brick Industry: real options and/or strategy by Wood, A & Driver, C
  
 
 
 
 
HYSTERESIS OF PLANT CLOSURES AND REOPENINGS  
IN THE UK BRICK INDUSTRY: REAL OPTIONS AND/OR  
STRATEGY* 
by 
 
Ciaran Driver 
University of London 
 
and 
 
Andrew Wood 
University of Essex 
 
WP No.04/05 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
 
Andrew Wood 
Department of Accounting, Finance and Management 
University of Essex 
Colchester 
Essex CO4 3SQ 
UK 
 
 
E-mail:  wooda@essex.ac.uk 
 
 2
HYSTERESIS OF PLANT CLOSURES AND REOPENINGS 
IN THE UK BRICK INDUSTRY: REAL OPTIONS AND/OR 
STRATEGY* 
 
 
 
 
Ciaran Driver† and Andrew Wood†† 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse industry dynamics in the UK bricks industry. This is an industry 
characterised by conditions that predict real options type behaviour in entry and exit. In 
addition, strategic interactions are likely. The market structure is oligopolistic and the 
existence of spatial competition due to high transport costs may favour preemption.   
 
We find evidence that uncertainty delays the decision to open and close plants, though 
this effect appears to be non-linear for the decision to open.  We find (limited) evidence 
for pre-emption. There is also support for other predictions of strategic behaviour such as 
differential probability of entry and exit depending on market share and history of 
acquisition activity.  
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HYSTERESIS OF PLANT CLOSURES AND REOPENINGS 
IN THE UK BRICK INDUSTRY: REAL OPTIONS AND/OR 
STRATEGY 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been increasing interest in industry dynamics - the process by which firms exit 
or enter an industry or region. No one theory has dominated this literature and it is 
characterised by a number of disparate approaches. One discourse focuses on 
evolutionary learning about productivity and selective exit or entry in explaining industry 
structure. There is also a literature on real options that addresses the timing of entry and 
exit as external shocks become less or more volatile. And finally there is a set of papers 
where the main focus is on the strategic interaction of differently placed rival firms in the 
entry and exit process. 1 
 
Our study is highly specific in that it concerns a single industry (bricks) characterised 
(due to high transport costs) by spatial competition. One implication of this is increased 
market power and likely strategic behaviour. In addition the technology is relatively 
mature and profitability is heavily influenced by external shocks to output price and the 
main input, energy. High sunk costs are a feature of the industry with much of the capital 
stock being industry and location specific. Given that simple framework, a natural 
question to explore is whether the observed patterns in opening and closing plants can be 
explained by I-O theories of real options and strategic behaviour. This paper addresses 
that question. 
 
The highly cyclical nature of bricks stock data (see Figure 1) suggests that brick 
manufacturers have been slow to respond to variation in demand by varying production.2 
                                                 
1 The first set of theories is most relevant to technology using industries. The main hypothesis is the 
existence of a firm-specific learning process by which some firms are selected for exit on the basis of 
revealed competence (See Lambson and Jensen 1998 for a review and empirical testing). Learning in 
respect of entry conditions is also one explanation as to why the hazard rate of entry for a firm may be 
increasing in its rival’s presence in a market (Toivanen and Waterson 1998); the dynamics may also depend 
on the size of the market (Asplund and Nocke  2000). In the second set of theories the shocks that cause 
entry and exit may be internal or common across firms (e.g. demand or relative price shocks); in either case 
the focus is on shocks characterised by stochastic processes where information is obtained by waiting. This 
implies that the effect on firms entry and exit is not immediate (Dixit 1989; Dixit and Pindyck 1994). The 
third body of literature analyses the strategic value of exiting to differently placed firms and posits a rich set 
of strategic determinants of entry (Ghemawat 1991, Geroski 1995; Lieberman 1987). 
2 This may be seen by analysing production and deliveries. Using standard procedures for a data sample 
1970-2001 these two variables are found to be cointegrated with an AIC-selected lag of 1 year and a long-
run cointegrating coefficient of almost exactly unity. The corresponding dynamic error correction equations 
show that the adjustment is of production to delivery as the error correction term is only significant for the 
dynamic production equation. However, the adjustment of production is slow with the coefficient on the 
error correction term being only -0.43. This means that less than half the desired adjustment is completed 
within a year. 
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As with many process industries, production and capacity are strongly correlated due to 
high energy costs making it uneconomic to operate much below capacity and due to the 
swift deterioration of unused capacity (kilns).  Thus inventory and capacity remain the 
key controls and the cyclicality of stocks reveals delays in opening and shutting plants. 
Despite this cautious behaviour, there was a high level of plant closures, re-
commissioning, and investment in new plants during the 16 year span that is the focus of 
this study.   
[FIGURE 1: about here] 
We first review in Sections 2 and 3 the main elements of each of the two theories that 
should contribute to explaining changes in plant status; we set out in each case the main 
hypotheses. Although hybrid models that combine strategic considerations and real 
options theory exist (See Boyer et al for a review), no robust or general conclusions have 
so far emerged. We therefore focus on elements of each theory that are relevant to our 
industry context. Section 4 introduces the data and estimation methods. The main results 
are presented in Section 5 with conclusions in Section 6 
2. The real options approach to entry and exit 
Real options theory provides one explanation for a delayed response under uncertainty to 
signals that would cause entry or exit in a frictionless world. The trigger values for 
irreversible investment or disinvestment are respectively above and below the 
corresponding Marshallian values (variable cost plus the servicing of sunk cost of entry 
or exit)  in the presence of  uncertainty, as long as information arrives stochastically over 
time.3  Models of the relationship of adjustment speed to uncertainty for irreversible 
investment are developed in Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), 
and Dixit and Pindyk (1994). A similar approach, reconciling the theory with standard q-
theory of investment, is developed in Abel and Eberly (1994) where it is shown that the 
extent of the zone of inaction with respect to the forcing variable depends on the level of 
uncertainty; furthermore, activity outside the zone of inaction is slowed by heightened 
uncertainty. 
 
Empirically, real option models of hysteresis have been applied to firms’ entry and exit 
into markets, in particular foreign markets (Dixit 1989) and to firms’ closure and re-
opening decisions, mainly, though not exclusively in the field of natural resources. (Slade 
2000, Moel and Tufano 2002).4  Our application to the bricks industry in the UK is one of 
                                                 
3 While most of the literature is concerned with the option to wait, and its effect on delaying investment, 
under some circumstances, increased uncertainty can accelerate project development, particularly where 
there is a time to build or where first mover advantages are significant (Bar-Ilan and Strange 1996; Folta 
and O’Brien 2004). 
4 A number of other attempts have been made to test real options theory. Chirinko and Schaller (2002) 
estimate a discount rate with a variable irreversibility premium for different sectors; Harchaoui and 
Lasserre (2001) test whether expected marginal profit is driven to zero by investment; Bell and Campa 
(1997) test the volatility of returns in the Chemicals industry. However, it has proved very difficult to test 
the theory of real options in a convincing way. Partly this is due to the theory itself being complex: option 
value depends on several factors such as the way information arrives over time; the duration of option 
rights; the importance of first mover advantages; and the rate of growth of the underlying project value.  
Indeed it is possible that the very complexity of the theory is responsible for the observation that firms 
frequently follow “rules of thumb” that apparently mimic real option optimisation within a limited range 
(McDonald 1998, Graham and Harvey 2001). 
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the few examples within manufacturing: see also Kovenoch and Phillips (1997). The 
bricks industry is of interest because three of the key assumptions of the real options 
model are prominent: capital investment is largely irreversible and not easily expandable 
ex-post; the demand for bricks is highly uncertain; and the existence of reserves and 
permissions correspond to an option to produce bricks.5  Exacerbating the irreversibility 
of capital expenditures is the fact that high energy costs prevent operational plants from 
producing at much below full capacity.  Investment in new plants is therefore undertaken 
in the knowledge that if demand conditions worsen the industry either has to accumulate 
stocks of unsold bricks in the hope of a recovery in demand or capacity will have to be 
closed or mothballed, decisions that are also costly to reverse. 6  These factors suggest 
some degree of hysteresis in the closing and re-opening decisions arising from the option 
value of waiting.   
 
A useful insight is given by Figure 2 below adapted from Brennan and Schwartz (1985).7 
This shows that there are critical prices at which the closure of previously open plants and 
the opening of previously closed ones become just optimal, given the cost of re-opening 
or closing the plant. The trigger prices are the solutions of the pair of Bellman equations 
that define the dynamic equilibrium for the plant in open and shut states, specifically: 
0)()()()()(5.0 '''22 =−Ψ+−−+ CPPrVPPVrPVP iii δσ   …(1) 
where the i  subscript represents the open or shut state and where Ψ is an indicator 
variable that equals zero if the plant is shut and 1 if it is open. 
The solution of these equations is derived in Dixit (1989) and some comparative statics 
are presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the classic case of GBM, infinitely lived 
options and complete irreversibility. The results here are intuitively obvious. For example 
the entry price trigger rises with exit cost as well as entry costs and the exit price trigger 
falls with entry cost as well as exit cost. Higher operating costs raise both the entry 
trigger and the exit trigger. These trigger prices also depend on other standard 
determinants of option value such as the current price, the volatility of the stochastic 
variable, assumed here to be price, the discount rate and the convenience yield.8  
 
[FIGURE 2: about here] 
 
2.1 Specific Real Options Hypotheses 
The theories above have suggested that the speed of implementation of a decision to close 
or re-open a plant may depend on a number of influences. While we do not have direct 
data on the speed of adjustment of firms we are able to set up a model for the hazard rate 
for reopening and closure. Specifically, the theory gives predictors of the probability of 
                                                 
5 Uncertainty in respect of demand is compounded by the high transport cost element that makes it 
uneconomic to export outside of a small catchment area.  The bulk of the output from a typical brick plant 
is supplied within a radius of 50-100 miles. 
6 As we are talking here about industry level uncertainty where firms cannot dispose of assets in a general 
downturn due to industry specificity of these assets, the effect of uncertainty is to slow down adjustment 
irrespective of the market structure. 
7 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that the difference between the value open and value shut between the two 
threshold prices is an s-shaped function in price. 
8 The latter is taken by Brennan and Schwartz to be a constant of the output price on the assumption that the 
yield derives from the ability to profit from temporary local shortages through ownership (p. 139). 
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the current state of each plant i.e. whether the plant is open or closed, conditional on its 
state in the previous period.  We present a summary of the predictions in Table 1, 
columns 2 and 3 which is adapted from Moel and Tufano (2002). 
 
Table 1 shows that the probability of triggering a change in status for the plant is 
determined by variables that determine the current value of the plant (price, quality, 
demand and operating cost); a set of volatility variables; the discount rate; and the costs 
of closure, reopening and maintaining a closed plant. The volatility measures are entered 
along with a quadratic term because of the putative non-linear effects in recent literature.9 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3. The strategic approach to entry and exit 
Strategic considerations may also influence the timing of plant openings and closures.  
One prediction on plant status depends on  firm size. Firms with a large existing share in 
a  region should be less likely to stay open or reopen given that any extra revenue would 
be offset by a negative effect of increased capacity on existing revenue – more so than for 
small share firms.  
 
The timing of entry and exit may also be seen in strategic terms. As this industry faces 
derived demand for a homogenous low-tech product, neither advertising nor product 
differentiation will feature strongly as a deterrent. Conditions are more favourable to a 
preemption strategy: the industry is geographically dispersed; capacity increments are 
large relative to the regional market size; investments are irreversible so the 
commissioning of a new plant represents a credible commitment to expanding output 
(Lieberman 1987).10 
 
The preemptive decision to keep plants open or to reopen plants previously closed can be 
addressed in our context by theories that predict the number and location of firms that are 
competing in spatially defined markets. The simplest such model predicts that plants will 
be equally spaced.11 The density of the spacing depends on the balance between static 
                                                 
9 Real options theory predicts a higher threshold for action but the argument that this produces delay is 
subject to a simultaneity critique in that increased uncertainty while increasing the threshold or trigger 
value for entry or exit also increases the probability of hitting the threshold. It is shown in Sarkar (2000) 
under highly specific assumptions that the probability of delay is related non-linearly to uncertainty with 
the assumed delaying effect evident only at higher degrees of uncertainty. This gives rise to an inverted U-
shape relationship between investment and uncertainty. Other explanations for this based on risk attitude 
are explained in Bo and Lensink (2004). A separate argument for a non-linear uncertainty effect – this time 
U-shaped – is given in Folta and O’Brien (2004) where the combination of deferment and growth options is 
shown to create possible non-linearities, due to the unbounded nature of the latter.  
10 Plant proliferation strategies are compared with limit pricing in a model of the ready-mixed concrete 
industry in Scherer and Ross (1990). The conclusion is that although proliferation may yield a lower 
expected profit conditional on the credibility of each policy, nevertheless proliferation may be chosen 
because of its superior credibility (p.402) and that this is more likely the higher the proportion of transport 
costs to the ex-works price. 
11 The assumptions are that firms can locate anywhere on a linear space; plants are sequentially built; plants 
are immobile once built; customers pay their own transport cost and /or there is no price discrimination. If 
in addition we make the assumptions of equal marginal costs of production and transport and also a 
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profits (favouring wide spacing) and the entry-deterrence effect (favouring dense 
spacing). A variety of approaches yield different values to entry deterrence depending on 
the exact assumptions. For example if we ignore any change in price on entry, the 
location of a plant (B) less than twice the minimum market size on either side of an 
existing plant (A) should forestall future entry between A and B; if the price should fall 
on entry this distance could be larger.  
 
The outcome of the above model is that there is no interpenetration of each plants’ 
markets and this may be thought unrealistic. Although firms may be spread over a region 
in a way that would make it difficult to serve each other’s customers there are many 
examples of rival plants in close proximity. We thus define a locality as an area where 
two or more plants exist within a 10-mile radius. The literature suggests some insights in 
respect of plants within localities or without localities. Extending the product 
differentiation theory of Shaked and Sutton (1990) to location choice, the location pattern 
should depend on a combination of two concerns: the incentive of all firms to expand 
demand by opening new plants and the incentive of incumbent firms to maintain spatial. 
A monopoly result is predicted as a sub-game perfect equilibrium at some high degree of 
post-entry competition. At lower levels of competition there is scope for duopoly to 
emerge as demand is expanded. Assuming homogeneous quality but spatial 
differentiation we may distinguish between location decisions within a locality and 
without it. In the latter case the expansion incentive may be high because the localities 
are more like “islands” with low cross-price elasticity; the corollary is also that there is 
less competition between localities.  In the within locality case on the other hand the 
output of different firms plants are not differentiated so the incentive to expand is low. If 
firms do not collude, the competition effect will also favour the monopoly outcome. 
Indeed if the monopoly outcome is not found it implies collusion. These points may be 
summarised in the following matrix: 
 
Within localities Between localities 
Competition Collusion  
Expected result: Each 
locality served by a separate 
firms plants 
Expected result: inter-
penetration of local markets 
by different firm plants 
Inter-penetration of non-
local markets i.e. plants 
from different firms 
characterise distinct local 
markets 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
uniform density of demand sufficient to cover fixed costs, we obtain the result that plants should be equally 
spaced.  The proof is contained in Hay (1976) and used in Scherer (1986). Demand is related linearly to the 
sum of the price and transport cost: q=a-P(+tZ) where Z is the customer distance from the plant and t is the 
transport cost. For a plant supplying over a distance M in either direction, sales are given by: 
∫ +−= M dZtZPbazPQ 0 )]([2),(  =2aM-2bPM-btM2 resulting in profit contribution: (P-c)Q. 
Profit maximisation results in equal M between plants with a price that rises linearly with M. Other models 
of spatial location  give conflicting results depending on the form of the demand or transport functions or 
the type of competition (Anderson and Neven 1991;Chamorro-Rivas 2000). 
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3.1 Specific Strategic Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis relates to the relative size within the region of the firm that owns a 
plant. The larger the existing revenue (as proxied by regional market share) the more the 
incentive for the firm to exit and the lower the incentive for the firm to reopen plants 
(Gilbert and Harris 1984; Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985, 1990; Lieberman 1990).   
 
Given our view on the importance of preemptive behaviour we also include the total 
number of plants in the region whether own or rival. This represents the extent to which 
the available spatial niches have been filled up by plants and a high score on this should 
deter reopening and maybe encourage exit. 
 
 Bearing in mind the discussion of Shaked and Sutton above, we further hypothesise that 
the existence of a local rival plant (i.e. within 10 miles) will also encourage exit and deter 
reopening (though a local own plant would not be expected to have this effect) as long as 
post-entry competition is strong, which we regard as a maintained hypothesis.  
 
An important consideration in strategic behaviour is whether a firm or its regional rival is 
financially constrained. Although we do not have data on liquidity, we do know which 
firms concluded recent acquisitions that are likely to have led to increased gearing. This 
will make these firms more cautious but their rivals may simultaneously become less 
timid. These hypotheses are tested using two dummy variables, one indicating that the 
plant is owned by a firm that has recently acquired; the other indicating that the plant has 
a regional rival that has recently acquired.  Both of these dummies are then interacted 
with dummies for the plant’s initial status (open or closed). 
 
The predicted influence of the strategic variables under the hypotheses outlined above in 
shown in Table 1, columns 4 and 5. 
4. Estimation methods and data sources 
The data set covers all brick firms that at some point during the period 1985-2000 
possessed brick plants with a total capacity of at least 50 million brick per year (between 
1% and 1.7% of total national capacity) and includes histories for all plants that have 
been owned by these firms. The sample period covers a number of economic cycles with 
three distinct sub-periods.  The first runs from 1985-89 during which time a number of 
new factories were commissioned to meet the rapidly increasing demand for bricks that 
was being fuelled by the 1980s housing boom.  The end of the boom was followed by a 
sharp contraction in demand during the early 1990s that resulted in both an increase in 
stocks and a substantial number of plant closures. Then a brief recovery in 1994 has been 
followed by an unprecedented period of stability. 
 
A full list of firms included in the panel is provided in Appendix 2.  The omitted firms are 
small, investment inactive single plant firms who are primarily operating from small scale 
sites that produce special bricks for niche markets.12  A list of plants operating during 
1981 was obtained from Ridgway (1982), the capacities of these plants and the 
                                                 
12 Some small single plant firms are included in the panel because they are acquired by larger firms during 
the sample period (for example, Collier, Rudgwick and Yorkshire Brick). 
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subsequent plant histories (including expansions, closures and reopenings) were obtained 
from a variety of sources including company reports, media news articles, the trade 
association and from the firms themselves.  The resulting unbalanced panel consists of 
annual data for a total of 122 plants.  
 
 Using probit analysis we estimate the probability of a plant being open at time t 
conditional on it being open at time t-1.  
 
 tijttititi fzxyy ,,1,, εδβα ++++= −   …(2) 
 
where tiy , takes the value one if plant i  is open at the end of period t  or zero if it begins 
the period closed,13  tix ,  is a vector of plant specific variables, tz  is a vector of demand 
variables, including price uncertainty, and jf  are firm based fixed effects. 
 
Due to the high weight to price ratio the majority of the output from a given plant is sold 
within 100 miles of the plant.  When calculating some of the demand variables and the 
strategic variables it is necessary to assign each plant to a region.  The assignment rule 
should reflect the road infrastructure adjacent to the plant in question.  So while use is 
made of the eleven standard regions of mainland Britain, when a plant is located adjacent 
to an efficient road network that makes for easy access to major metropolises of 
neighbouring regions that plant is classified as being a supplier to each of those regions.14 
We also define a local plant as one within 10 miles of the plant in question.  
5. Results 
Table 2 reports results for the panel regressions with firm fixed effects as the likelihood 
ratio tests indicate the fixed effects are important.    Many of the strategic variables are 
interacted with a dummy signifying whether the plant begins the period open or closed.  
Accordingly coefficients situated on the left of the column are estimated for open plants, 
those on the right are for plants that begin the period closed, while those in the centre of 
the columns are estimated without distinguishing between the plants’ initial status.  We 
also allow for potential differences between the decision to reopen previously closed 
(mothballed) plants and the decision to open greenfield or brownfield plants by first 
defining the ‘closed’ interaction term to include only mothballed plants, i.e. those plants 
that begin the period closed but had at some point in the past been open (columns 3 and 
4), and then defining it more broadly so that it includes all plants that begin the period 
                                                 
13  Once closed, unless the plant has been demolished by the owning firm with the land being turned over to 
alternative use it remains in the panel for a further five years during which time it is regarded as a live 
option which the firm could exercise by re-opening.  Five years is chosen as the cut off point as by this time 
the mothballed plant will have seriously deteriorated and if the firm wishes to re-commission the site it will 
be required to request planning permission. Firms with major capacity expansions on the same site are 
classed as reopenings.  
14 For example, a number of plants are situated in and around the West Midlands town of Stoke-on-Trent 
which is adjacent to the M6 that provides easy access to the major markets of Birmingham in the West 
Midlands and Manchester and Liverpool in the North West.  For this reason these plants are considered to 
be competing with other firms that supply both the West Midlands markets and the markets of the North 
West. 
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closed, whether they had been open in the past or whether they were new greenfield or 
brownfield plants (columns 5 and 6).  In each case two results are reported, one including 
the majority of the variables listed in table 1, the other reports a parsimonious version. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Column 3 shows that many of the hypotheses of the real option model are supported. 
Variables representing the value of the plant such as price and size of plant (plant 
capacity as a proxy for cost) are significant and plants that produce bricks of high 
aesthetic quality are significantly more likely to be open. The high coefficient for the 
Fletton dummy variable confirms the long term downward trend in the demand for 
Fletton bricks. The fuel cost variable was never significant and is not reported.  Recent 
capital investment, intended as a proxy for operating cost is correctly signed but not 
significant; neither is the interest rate. 
 
Uncertainty plays an important role in influencing the decision to open or close a plant.  
Plants that begin the period closed are likely to remain closed at high levels of uncertainty 
but as uncertainty decreases, the probability of being opened also increases.  The 
relationship between uncertainty and the probability of an open plant remaining opened is 
non-linear, with the probability of inaction being very high for average levels of 
uncertainty but decreasing as uncertainty increases or decreases (figure 3).  The non-
linearity is statistically significant but modest.  The lowest level of uncertainty that was 
measured during the sample period was 0.20 at which point the probability of remaining 
open was 0.933.  The probability rose to a peak of 0.994 before falling to 0.967 at the 
highest level of observed uncertainty (1.94). 
(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
The character of the observed non-linearity suggests that over most of the sampled range 
of price uncertainty hysteresis increases in uncertainty for both the closing and the 
reopening decision. There is some suggestion that at very high levels of uncertainty the 
probability of remaining open is reduced. Our preferred explanation for this is the 
behavioural effect of risk attitude that may differ according to the level of uncertainty (Bo 
and Lensink 2004). Specifically at very high levels of uncertainty firms appear to act in a 
risk-averse manner. 
 
Turning now to the strategic variables, our first specific hypothesis from section 3.1 was 
that own capacity share in a region should negatively affect the likelihood of re-opening 
or remaining open. This prediction is strongly confirmed for the reopening decision in 
Table 2, column 4. Thus, larger firms are less likely to open plants in regions where they 
already have a large presence.  This is consistent with the Gilbert and Harris (1984) 
argument that larger firms will adopt a more conservative capacity stance because their 
incremental revenue is less than smaller firms.15  The number of the firm’s plants in a 
region (which might indicate the spatial spread) does not add any extra explanatory 
power to the regional share variable. However, the total number of plants (own plus rival) 
does deter reopening in line with the view that preemptive activity operates to fill all 
available spatial niches. 
 
                                                 
15 A size effect (for single establishment firms) is found in Disney et al 2003. 
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Another hypothesis set out in section 3.1 is that the existence of a local rival plant will 
deter reopening and encourage exit. We find strong support against this in column 4 of 
Table 2. Of the plants that reopen approximately 60% have a local rival and it is these 
plants that are more likely to re-open. This is a similar result to that found in Toivanen 
and Waterson (2003) and is explained there in terms of learning in respect of demand 
conditions. An alternative explanation could be the possibility of poaching skilled labour 
from the rival plant if the efficiency of the newly opened plant accommodated higher 
wage rates. Given the homogeneous nature of bricks, the failure to find a negative 
significance for local rivals (irrespective of the prior status of plants) could also suggest 
that the maintained hypothesis of strong ex-post competition may be incorrect and that 
some degree of collusion exists that supports an outcome of two rival local plants 
 
There is some indirect support for the influence of financing constraints in influencing 
firms’ decisions. Although previous acquisition does not significantly influence the 
probability of the acquiring firms’ plants remaining open, it does influence the probability 
that regional rival firms’ plants remain open.  This supports our hypothesis that acquiring 
firms are regarded as vulnerable because they are highly geared, giving regional rival 
firms an incentive to keep their plants open for longer in the expectation that the highly 
indebted acquirer will have to retrench should demand conditions require it. 16  
 
5.2 The Extent and Causes of Hysteresis  
Plots of the probability of a plant being open at the end of the period based on the model 
reported in column 4 of table 2 are reported in figure 4.17  Figure 4a shows a large gap 
between the two probability curves, indicating that across a range of prices the most 
likely outcome is inaction, with open plants remaining open and closed plants staying 
closed.   
 
The sources of this hysteresis effect are explored in figures 4b and 4c.  The plot for the 
‘full model’ corresponds to that in figure 4a, while the plots for the ‘option model’ 
exclude the impact from the variables that have been identified as strategic and the 
‘strategic model’ excludes the uncertainty variables.  Finally, the ‘no model’ plot 
excludes both the strategic and uncertainty variables and is therefore based solely on the 
impact of the demand and plant specific variables, and of course the dummy signifier of 
whether the plant began the period open, as reported in column 4 of table 2. 
 
[FIGURE 4: about here] 
Using the ‘no model’ plot as a benchmark, both the strategic variables and the uncertainty 
variables can be seen to result in a higher price being required to trigger the opening of a 
previously closed plant, with the hysteresis effect being stronger for the strategic 
variables than for the uncertainty variables (Figure 4b).  This can be contrasted with the 
impact of the same variables on the probability of an open plant remaining open where it 
                                                 
16 While the insignificant coefficient for the acquiring firm dummy would seem to suggest that this 
expectation is not actually realised, there is evidence to show that on two occasions (following Redland’s 
acquisition of Steetley in 1992 and Ibstock’s acquisition of Redland in 1996) the acquiring firm did indeed 
follow these acquisitions with substantial rationalisations (Wood 2003). 
17 Probabilities are calculated for the average firm, with averages of independent variables calculated over 
the whole sample period for both open and closed plants. 
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can be seen that while the uncertainty variables reduce the price at which a plant is likely 
to be closed, this hysteresis effect is not contributed to by the strategic variables which 
have virtually no net effect; hence the curve for the strategic model is coincident with that 
of  the ‘no model’ benchmark (Figure 4c).   
 
The results here constitute something of a puzzle. If the industry is regarded as one where 
pre-emption is important, then first mover advantages should destroy option effects for 
the case of plant openings (Weeds 2002). Put differently, if an available niche becomes 
available for pre-emption, the option to wait to preempt is not valuable. Option value still 
characterises open plants so that hysteresis effects are understandable for the decision to 
close. The pattern that would be expected therefore would be for strategic effects to 
dominate for the opening decision and options effects to dominate for closure. However, 
we find no such pattern in these results. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the influences of decisions to open or close brick plants, with 
particular interest in identifying hysteresis effects that may explain the delay in the brick 
manufacturers in responding to swings in demand.  The real options approach to 
investment behaviour suggests that hysteresis results from high uncertainty that increases 
the value of waiting.  Our results show that higher levels of uncertainty do indeed result 
in inactivity, be it in opening or closing brick plants.  There is, however, evidence of this 
effect diminishing at high levels of uncertainty for the decision to open a brick plant.  
This is consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests that the relationship between 
uncertainty and investment behaviour may be non-linear, possibly due to risk attitude. 
 
Complementary explanations rest on strategic considerations and also on a variety of 
direct and indirect costs incurred when opening or closing factories.  After taking account 
of demand and cost influences we do not find strong evidence of strategic influences in 
the decision as to whether to close or keep open an existing plant. 
 
There is stronger support for a strategic influence in the decision to reopen existing 
closed plants. Here we find evidence of a size effect whereby smaller firms are more 
likely to enter given that the effect on existing own sales is less than for larger firms. The 
higher the total number of plants in a region, given its demand profile, the less the 
likelihood of reopening this result is consistent with spatial preemption. Firms that reopen 
are more likely to do so where there is a local rival. This rather surprising result echoes 
that of Toivanen and Waterson for the fast food industry and may be due to learning in 
respect of demand conditions or the availability of skilled labour. 
 
The high number of acquisitions that have taken place during the sample period appear to 
have influenced the timing of plant closures.  Although we cannot establish that plants of 
acquiring firms are significantly more likely to close (or not re-open) we find that 
regional rivals react strongly when a firm acquires. Specifically the firm is perceived to 
have high debt and this increases the chance of rival being open. 
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Overall, the results suggest that in addition to standard cost and demand considerations, 
real options influences are of great importance in understanding the closure and the 
reopening decisions. Strategic considerations seem important for the decision to reopen 
but negligible for the decision to close. The latter  finding  is consistent with the multiple 
and complex set of reasons for closure that have been found in case studies of exit 
behaviour. However, the finding here undermines the simple theoretical prediction that 
options effects should be more important for the decision to close than to open if the 
latter decision involves pre-emption.  
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Appendix 1. Data sources and description 
 
  
Plant begins period open Dummy takes the value of 1 if the plant is open at the begin of 
the period, otherwise zero  
Demand variables  
Brick price The brick price index is obtained from official sources and is 
deflated by the GDP deflator 
Stocks Stocks vary with both changes in demand and in production, and 
since production is approximately equal to capacity, the regional 
level of stocks is included as a proxy for excess capacity 
Change in housing starts the change in regional housing starts (more than half of brick 
production is used in the construction of housing) 
Real interest rate the real spot rate on 10 year government bonds obtained from 
the Bank of England 
Plant variables  
Aesthetic quality With advice from one of the country’s leading brick consultants 
plant output was graded according to its aesthetic quality.  The 
main determinant of the aesthetic quality of a brick is the clay, 
though additives and the technique for forming the brick are also 
important.  While this may be regarded as a highly subjective 
venture, there are certain aesthetic qualities relating to the colour 
and texture of a brick that can be recognised as more or less 
desirable, and therefore being reflected in the price.  The output 
of each plant was given a grade ranging from A for bricks which 
possess an inherent beauty in terms of both colour and texture, B 
for bricks which can be described as less handsome but 
nevertheless capable of being used for the construction of an 
attractive house, to C for the more utilitarian bricks which may 
be used for mass housing but require mixing with some bricks of 
different colours to avoid a barrack-block effect.  The final 
classifications were shown to Production Directors for 
corroboration 
Fletton brick Fletton clay is used by London Brick Company.  The product is 
generally inferior to non-fletton bricks in terms of both aesthetic 
quality and durability.  With the long term decline in demand for 
inferior bricks LBC has substantially rationalised its capacity 
and invested heavily in the remaining plants in an attempt to 
improve the quality of its output. 
Log Plant capacity Plant capacity is measured at the beginning of each year. 
Information on plant capacity is obtained from media sources 
and from interviews with firm managers. 
Received substantial 
investment in past 5years 
Investment histories for individual plants are obtained from 
trade journals.  Details of investment in new capacity and in 
modernising existing plants are often well publicised in advance. 
Strategic variables  
Firm has recently acquired  Dummy variables indicating whether the owning firm has made 
a large acquisition (in excess of £50m) during the preceding two 
years (including the year of acquisition)  
Firm’s neighbour has 
recently acquired  
A dummy variable for whether a rival firm operating within it’s 
locality has made a large acquisition during the preceding two 
years 
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Regional capacity share  Each plant is situated within a region that is defined according to 
the available road infrastructure. The owning firm’s total 
capacity of plants supplying that region is then divided by the 
capacity of all plants supplying that region. 
Total number of regional 
plants 
The total number of operating plants that supply the region. 
 
Own local plant A dummy variable indicating whether the owning firm owns 
another open plant within a 10 mile radius.  This relatively short 
distance is chosen because the variable is intended to capture the 
impact a friendly neighbour has on recruitment and 
redundancies.  10 miles is considered appropriate given the rural 
settings and localised employment of many brick plants 
Rival local plant A dummy variable indicating whether a rival plant is operational 
within a 10 mile radius. 
Uncertainty  
Uncertainty  In keeping with much of the literature we model uncertainty by 
the volatility of prices. A standard ADF test suggests that both 
the log of brick price and the fuel price are non-stationary. 
Accordingly we difference the series before testing for ARCH  
effects in a parsimonious autoregressive equation obtained from 
testing down from a model with 12 lags. As we did not discover 
any ARCH effects we calculated price volatility as the standard 
deviation of the twelve previous monthly residuals from the AR 
model.  The resulting measure is standardized so that the 
average is 1 
Uncertainty squared  Following Sarkar (2000) and Folta and O’Brien (2004) we allow 
for the possibility of a non-linear uncertainty effect. 
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dependent variable 1.000
plant begins open 0.803 1.000
brick price 0.236 0.192 1.000
stocks -0.101 -0.058 -0.285 1.000
housing starts -0.036 -0.058 -0.072 -0.283 1.000
interest rate -0.048 -0.077 0.121 -0.223 0.271 1.000
low aesthetic quality -0.097 -0.090 0.025 -0.153 0.053 0.010 1.000
high aesthetic quality 0.027 0.025 -0.018 0.161 -0.056 -0.006 -0.480 1.000
fletton -0.098 -0.088 0.024 0.344 0.000 0.004 0.203 -0.130 1.000
capacity 0.198 0.170 -0.036 0.129 0.014 -0.051 0.310 -0.403 0.450 1.000
substantial investment 0.106 0.031 0.130 -0.017 -0.014 -0.010 0.096 -0.037 -0.036 0.150 1.000
firm has recently acquired -0.130 -0.090 -0.301 0.037 0.069 -0.009 -0.092 0.096 -0.079 -0.035 -0.006 1.000
regional rival has acquired -0.064 -0.095 -0.184 0.063 -0.100 0.030 -0.025 0.021 -0.005 0.022 -0.019 -0.013 1.000
share 0.037 0.064 -0.121 -0.266 0.037 -0.056 0.141 -0.173 0.033 0.299 -0.050 0.227 -0.016 1.000
number of plants 0.019 0.034 0.239 0.655 -0.113 -0.005 -0.062 0.145 0.554 0.192 0.080 -0.111 -0.037 -0.355 1.000
local own plant 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.131 -0.011 -0.019 0.042 -0.132 0.182 0.240 0.035 0.071 -0.018 0.248 0.192 1.000
local rival plant 0.139 0.129 0.050 -0.022 -0.047 -0.021 -0.154 0.094 -0.298 -0.078 0.125 0.061 -0.036 -0.053 -0.024 0.068 1.000
uncertainty 0.033 -0.004 -0.018 -0.158 0.116 0.077 -0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.016 0.081 0.247 0.034 -0.023 -0.004 -0.025 1.000
uncertainty squared 0.034 0.015 -0.018 -0.102 0.071 0.054 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.089 0.230 0.019 0.008 0.000 -0.012 0.975 1.000  
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Appendix 2 
 1985 1989 2000 
Ambion*   5 
Armitage 2 
Acquired by Marshalls 
(1988: £70m)  
Baggeridge 3 5 6 
Blockleys 1 3 2 
Butterley 18 17 11 
Caradale**   2 
Chelwood***   6 
Blue Circle 1 2 
Acquired by Chelwood 
(1997: £14.4m) 
Cranleigh****   1 
Collier 1 
Acquired by Salvesen 
(1988: £3.7m)  
Errol*****   1 
GISCOL 7 7 MBO Caradale (1997) 
Ibstock 11 11 26 
Innes Lee 2 
Acquired by Tarmac 
(1988: £10.6m)  
LBC 9 9 3 
Lumley 1 
Acquired by Steetley 
(1987: £1.6m)  
Marley 1 4 
Acquired by Tarmac 
(1993: Asset swap) 
Marshalls  3 4 
McAlpine 1 
Acquired by Marley 
(1988: £3.6m)  
Nottingham 2 
Acquired by Marley 
(1987: £40.2m)  
Ockley 1 
Acquired by Blue Circle 
(1987: £73m)  
Phoenix******   1 
Raeburn 1 2 1 
Redland 18 18 
Acquired by Ibstock 
(1996: £155m) 
Rudgwick 1 1 
Acquired by Chelwood 
(1998) 
Salvesen 2 4 
MBO Chelwood (1995: 
£63.5m) 
SBC 2 2 
Acquired by Ibstock 
(1994: £14.8m) 
Sevalco 1 
Acquired by Tarmac 
(1987: £13m)  
Yorkshire Brick 1 1 
Acquired by Marhsalls 
(1994:) 
Steetley 9 12 
Acquired by Redland 
Brick (1992: £625m18) 
Tarmac 6 9 
Acquired by Ibstock 
(1995: £65m) 
Wemyss 1 1 1 
* MBO of Ibstock plants following DTI ruling on Ibstock’s acquisition of Redland, £53m. 
** MBO of GISCOL bricks in 1997. 
*** MBO of Salvesen brick, 1995. 
**** MBO of this Redland plant following an OFT ruling relating to Redland’s acquisition of Steetley, 1992. 
***** Mothballed by Marley and sold by Tarmac to Errol Brick, 1994. 
****** Mothballed by Tarmac, re-opened following MBO, 1993. 
                                                 
18 Includes acquisition of Steetley tiles. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3: Probability of plant being open at end of period 
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Figure 4a: Probability of plant being open at end of period 
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Figure 4b: Probability of closed plant being opened 
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Figure 4c: Probability of open plant remaining open 
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Table 1: Hypotheses 
Hysteresis explained by Real Options Real Options Strategic 
behaviour 
Strategic 
behaviour 
 Previously 
open 
Previously shut Previously 
open 
Previously shut 
Prior state + - + - 
Brick price + + + - 
Brick quality (1=high) + + + + 
Proxy for inverse regional 
demand: Stocks 
- - - - 
Proxy for regional demand: 
housing starts 
+ + + + 
Discount rate (real long rate) + + - - 
Operating cost proxy 1: fuel 
cost index 
- - - - 
Operating cost proxy 2: size of 
plant 
- - - - 
Operating cost proxy 3: recent 
investment in the plant 
- - - - 
Price volatility + [non-linear] -[non-linear] NA NA 
Fuel cost volatility + [non-linear] -[non-linear] NA NA 
Cost of shut-down and 
reopening: function of size  
+ - + NA 
Regional size of company NA NA - - 
Number of plants owned  by 
company  
NA NA - + 
Total number of plants 
operating in the region 
NA NA - - 
Existence of own local plant NA NA ? ? 
Existence of rival local plant NA NA - - 
Plant owned by recently 
acquired or acquiring firm 
(proxy for gearing) 
NA NA - - 
Local company plant owned 
by recently acquired or 
acquiring firm (proxy for 
gearing) 
NA NA + + 
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Table 2: Probit analysis of probability of plant being open at end of period 
          
 average Open Mothball Open Mothball Open Close Open Close 
Plant begins period 
open 
0.855 
 
0.0821 
(0.291) 
0.0163 
(0.713) 
0.2563 
(0.053) 
0.2854 
(0.000) 
Demand variables          
Brick price 1.141 
 
0.7900 
(0.000) 
0.7498 
(0.000) 
0.6860 
(0.000) 
0.7559 
(0.000) 
Stocks 158.564 
 
0.001 
(0.512) 
 0.0000 
(0.749) 
  
Change in housing 
starts 
-0.082 
 
0.0007 
(0.369) 
 0.0003 
(0.641) 
  
Real interest rate 4.000 
 
0.0034 
(0.585) 
 0.0006 
(0.899) 
  
Plant variables          
Low aesthetic quality 0.089 
 
-0.0524 
(0.004) 
-0.0523 
(0.007) 
-0.0490 
(0.002) 
-0.0511 
(0.002) 
High aesthetic quality 0.436 
 
0.0504 
(0.015) 
0.0526 
(0.021) 
0.0407 
(0.014) 
0.0435 
(0.011) 
Fletton brick 0.086 
 
-0.2302 
(0.002) 
-0.3209 
(0.000) 
-0.1906 
(0.007) 
-0.1937 
(0.004) 
Log Plant capacity 1.400 
 
0.1778 
(0.000) 
0.1996 
(0.000) 
0.1576 
(0.000) 
0.1629 
(0.000) 
Substantial investment 
in past 5years 
0.104 
 
0.0354 
(0.226) 
 0.0421 
(0.070) 
0.0469 
(0.054) 
Uncertainty          
Uncertainty  0.992 
 
0.2712 
(0.000) 
-0.0984 
(0.383) 
0.3200 
(0.000) 
-0.1200 
(0.001) 
0.2224 
(0.000) 
-0.0900 
(0.324) 
0.2504 
(0.000) 
-0.0570 
(0.007) 
Uncertainty squared 1.345 
 
-0.1172 
(0.001) 
0.0026 
(0.966) 
-0.1381 
(0.000) 
 -0.0967 
(0.001) 
0.0251 
(0.563) 
-0.1080 
(0.000)  
Strategic variables          
Regional capacity 
share 
0.272 
 
0.0421 
(0.449) 
-0.6156 
(0.002)  
-0.6124 
(0.001) 
0.0190 
(0.694) 
-0.3600 
(0.001)  
-0.3835 
(0.004) 
Total number of open 
plants in region 16.94 
-0.0022 
(0.208) 
-0.0089 
(0.004)  
-0.0090 
(0.007) 
-0.0015 
(0.367) 
-0.0014 
(0.457) 
-0.0020 
(0.053) 
Local own plant 
0.499 
-0.0228 
(0.216) 
0.0101 
(0.782) 
-0.0252 
(0.149)  
-0.0173 
(0.275) 
0.0017 
(0.946) 
 
 
Local rival plant 
0.485 
-0.0037 
(0.853) 
0.0551 
(0.041)  
0.0634 
(0.017) 
-0.0055 
(0.748) 
0.0455 
(0.002) 
 0.0513 
(0.001) 
Firm has recently 
acquired 
0.107 
 
-0.0536 
(0.166) 
0.0400 
(0.355)   
-0.0359 
(0.262) 
-0.0250 
(0.671)  
 
Firm’s regional rival 
has recently acquired 
0.156 
 
0.0607 
(0.007) 
0.0453 
(0.191) 
0.0616 
(0.003) 
0.0520 
(0.006) 
0.0098 
(0.768) 
0.0442 
(0.002) 
          
Sample  1714 1714 1714 1714 
McFadden R2  0.7014 0.6957 0.6876 0.6840 
Log likelihood  -230.30 -234.66 -240.92 -243.67 
 
Reported coefficients are marginal effects calculated at the variables’ mean values, with the exception of coefficients 
for dummy variables that measure the effect of a change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1 (calculated at the mean 
values for all other variables). 
p-values calculated from robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
   
